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INTRODUCTION
People are often optimistic.  Nearly fifty percent of marriages end
in divorce, but one survey found that 100 percent of individuals plan-
ning to get married believed they would never get divorced.1  Most
people think they drive better than the average driver, and at one
university, ninety-four percent of professors placed themselves in the
top fifty percent in terms of teaching skills.2  We often seem to think
we are like the youth of Garrison Keillor’s fictional hometown Lake
Wobegon, where “all the children are above average.”3
This is not always a bad thing.  Optimism can be advantageous.
Without optimism, Columbus might not have discovered the New
World and Steve Jobs might not have started Apple Computer in his
parents’ garage.  Indeed, without optimism, many of us might not be
able to rouse ourselves from our beds each morning to face the day.
But optimism poses dangers as well.  This Article examines one of the
more costly and intractable problems that can arise from optimism:
the problem of regulating optimism-driven speculation in financial
markets.
Part I shows how optimism-driven speculative trading can be a
kind of market failure that predictably generates economic losses to
society.  It begins by defining the difference between risk and uncer-
tainty, and demonstrating how uncertainty (unlike risk) permits sub-
jective disagreement over future values.  It then offers a simple model
of markets in which relative optimism generates disagreement-based
trading in financial instruments and derivative contracts by specula-
tors who hope to profit from predicting future events more accurately
than others do.  It notes how this sort of disagreement-based trading
has received relatively little attention in the modern economic litera-
ture, which instead tends to implicitly (and somewhat misleadingly)
assume that “speculative” trading is driven not by subjective disagree-
ment in the face of uncertainty, but by differences in traders’ risk aver-
sion and liquidity needs, or differences in their access to certain, but
costly, information.  Nevertheless, disagreement-based speculative
trading represents a form of market failure that deserves attention.
Part I demonstrates how transactions driven by uncertainty and disa-
greement can generate net economic losses by increasing traders’
1 See Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Per-
ceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443
(1993).
2 RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 32 (2008).
3 See generally Nan L. Maxwell & Jane S. Lopus, The Lake Wobegon Effect in Student Self-
Reported Data, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 201, 201 (1994) (discussing self-reporting biases among
students).
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risks, eroding their returns, and distorting consumption decisions in a
fashion that leads to boom-and-bust cycles.
Part II then turns to a second, and still more daunting, challenge
raised by the phenomenon of dangerous optimism: the challenge that
societies that rely on democratic governance face in attempting to use
law to limit the social costs of disagreement-based speculation.  Part II
shows how, just as optimism in the face of uncertainty leads to adverse
selection among participants in speculative trading markets, it also
leads to adverse selection among participants in democratic political
systems.  In particular, optimism systematically stunts the development
of constituencies that favor reining in costly speculation, both before
and after social losses have been incurred.  This suggests that demo-
cratic institutions may be fundamentally unsuited for dealing with the
economic problems that can arise from optimism-fueled financial
speculation.  Part II develops this argument by examining the history
of the regulation of derivatives, perhaps the quintessential speculative
financial market.  History supports the view that only relatively un-
democratic institutions—in particular, courts, independent agencies,
and private self-regulatory bodies—have proven successful at stem-
ming social losses from speculative trading.  It also offers cautionary
lessons into the likely success of the newly enacted Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) as a regu-
latory response intended to ward off future speculative crises like
those we have just experienced.4
I
OPTIMISTIC SPECULATION AS MARKET FAILURE
A. Optimism And Uncertainty
To understand how optimism-driven speculative trading can re-
duce social welfare, it is first essential to understand the phenomenon
that allows for optimism: uncertainty.  Because the idea of uncertainty
is fundamental to our analysis, let us take some time to unpack it and
explore its meaning.
Laypersons often treat the words “risk” and “uncertainty” as syno-
nyms.  However, in economic theory in general, and in finance in par-
ticular, there is a great distinction between statistical risk and the
more fundamental (and far more intractable) problem of statistical
uncertainty.  The point was perhaps first made by early twentieth cen-
tury economist Frank Knight in his 1921 treatise Risk, Uncertainty and
Profit.5  Knight argued that the word “risk” should be used to refer to
4 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
5 FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT (1921).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\97-5\CRN505.txt unknown Seq: 4 27-JUN-12 14:37
1180 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:1177
situations where we expect variation in ex post outcomes, but the
probabilities of the different possible future outcomes are known ex
ante.6  For example, a coin toss is risky.  Although we do not know if
the coin will come up heads or tails, we do know (with certainty) that
the odds of either outcome are fifty percent.  Similarly, we do not
know whether a particular fifty-year-old American male will develop
prostate cancer.  However, we do know that the risk of the average
fifty-year-old American male developing prostate cancer within twenty
years is 8.3 percent.7
As these examples illustrate, when we face mere risk, the
probabilities of possible outcomes are known ex ante, even if the out-
comes themselves are not.  Uncertainty, Knight argued, is quite differ-
ent from risk.  Uncertainty exists in situations where we not only face
variations in future outcomes, but the probabilities associated with
possible future outcomes—indeed, possibly even the nature of future
outcomes—are not known ex ante.8  As John Maynard Keynes put it:
By “uncertain” knowledge . . . I do not mean merely to distinguish
what is known for certain from what is only probable.  The game of
roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty . . . .  The sense
in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a
European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of
interest twenty years hence . . . .  About these matters there is no
scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability
whatever. We simply do not know.9
Most modern bankers, traders, and finance theorists are quite
comfortable with the concept of risk.  There are plenty of mathemati-
cal tools for valuing assets and investments on the basis of known
probabilities.  But dealing with uncertainty is a different, and far more
difficult matter.  In his bestseller, The Black Swan, Nassim Taleb docu-
ments how people in general—and people in the financial world and
academic finance in particular—often fail to take account of or even
recognize uncertainty.10  Taleb points out that even though uncer-
tainty often keeps people from making perfect forecasts, people often
also fail to understand or appreciate their own inability to make per-
fect forecasts.  According to Taleb, “What is surprising is not the mag-
nitude of our forecast errors, but our absence of awareness of it.”11  In
Taleb’s view, we are surprisingly blind to the reality of uncertainty.  To
6 See id. at 19–20.
7 See Prostate Cancer Risk by Age, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://
www.cdc.gov/cancer/prostate/statistics/age.htm (last updated Aug. 13, 2010).
8 See KNIGHT, supra note 5, at 19–20. R
9 J.M. Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, 51 Q.J. ECON. 209, 213–14 (1937).
10 See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBA-
BLE passim (2007).
11 Id. at xx (emphasis added).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\97-5\CRN505.txt unknown Seq: 5 27-JUN-12 14:37
2012] UNCERTAINTY, DANGEROUS OPTIMISM 1181
paraphrase Keynes, we simply do not know that we simply do not
know.
This blindness to uncertainty permits both relative optimism and
relative pessimism.12  Risk alone does not permit optimism—it would
be unreasonable to be optimistic about the outcome of a coin toss.
There is a fifty percent probability a fair coin will come up heads, and
a fifty percent probability that it will come up tails.  One would have to
be disconnected from reality to think the chances of a fair coin com-
ing up heads were eighty percent.  But we can be optimistic or pessi-
mistic when we forecast the odds that the global population will be
decimated by a pandemic by 2015; that China will account for more
than fifty percent of the world’s GDP by 2025; or that petroleum will
become irrelevant as an energy source by 2030.  We can assign subjec-
tive probabilities to these outcomes, but our assignments are little
more than guesses.  These sorts of events are unique, so we have little
or no solid basis in past experience to make predictions.
In a world of uncertainty, in other words, rational people can have
differing subjective beliefs about probabilities.  One Italian adventurer
might estimate the chances of finding a new route to India by sailing
west at zero (and, presumably, venture in another direction).  An-
other Italian adventurer might be more optimistic about a western
route, and set out to find one.  In the case of Christopher Columbus,
such relative optimism brought reward, albeit unexpectedly, with the
discovery of the New World (although there were plenty of other opti-
mistic adventurers who never returned from optimism-fueled and un-
certain voyages).
Relative optimism and pessimism appear endemic among human
beings.13  This indicates that uncertainty is endemic, too.  After all,
the less we know about the probabilities of future events, the more it
becomes possible to hold a subjective belief about those events that is
different from, and either more optimistic or more pessimistic than,
beliefs held by other people.  This observation suggests that in many
areas of life, it will be difficult to understand human behavior without
taking account of uncertainty and relative optimism.  Nowhere may
this be more true than in financial markets.
12 In the face of uncertainty, optimism and pessimism are always relative phenomena.
When probabilities are uncertain, we simply lack the information necessary to judge
whether a particular forecast is objectively more or less optimistic than the unknown fu-
ture.  All we can judge is whether an individual’s prediction is optimistic or pessimistic
relative to the predictions of others.
13 Again, under uncertainty, optimism and pessimism are relative. See supra note 12. R
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B. Speculation in Financial Markets
Finance economists have developed a number of tools for valuing
risky assets in situations where probabilities can be estimated accu-
rately.  The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)14 and the
Black–Scholes options pricing formula15 are two well-known exam-
ples.  But we lack the tools necessary to place a value on assets whose
worth depends on the uncertain unknown.  When people disagree in
the face of uncertainty, there is no way to determine ex ante whose
beliefs are correct.  The attempt to employ formal mathematical valu-
ation models is defeated by what Keynes described as “the dark forces
of time and ignorance which envelop our future.”16
This has led many in the world of finance, and especially many in
academic finance, to simply ignore uncertainty and analyze financial
markets as if they suffered only from risk.17  In effect, they choose to
look for the car keys under the lamppost where the light is, rather
than in the dark parking lot where the keys were lost.  In the process,
they overlook the key to understanding one of the most endemic and
important characteristics of many financial markets: a fundamentally
speculative nature.
Financial markets are irresistibly attractive to speculators.  To un-
derstand why, it is useful to begin by recognizing that in nonfinancial
markets, people typically buy goods and services in order to consume
them.  We buy cars to transport us from one place to another, hire
accountants to calculate our taxes, and purchase penicillin to cure
infections.  Sometimes, however, people do buy nonfinancial com-
modities not to consume them, but to try to profit by reselling them to
someone else at a higher price.  This Article will refer to this practice
as “speculation.”  If I buy a house to live in it, I have purchased the
house for consumption.  If I buy a house to “flip” it by selling it to
someone else for a higher price, I am speculating.  The speculator’s
mantra is “buy low, sell high.”
Speculation requires disagreement.  After all, if the market prices
a house at $500,000 and I agree with that valuation, I will only want to
purchase the house if I want to live in (“consume”) it.  But if the mar-
ket prices a house at $500,000 and I believe it is really worth $525,000,
14 See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
161–62, 916 (4th ed. 1991).
15 See id. at 502–03, 917.
16 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND
MONEY 155 (1936).
17 The index of the typical finance text contains numerous references to risk and few,
if any, to uncertainty. See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 14, at I-17 to I-21; EUGENE F. R
BRIGHAM & JOEL F. HOUSTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, I-6, I-7 (Concise
6th ed., 2009); JOHN C. HULL, FUNDAMENTALS OF FUTURES AND OPTIONS MARKETS 558, 560
(6th ed., 2008).
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my disagreement with the market’s valuation might tempt me to buy
the house for $500,000 (if possible) in order to resell it and make a
$25,000 profit.  It should be noted that this type of speculation re-
quires me to be optimistic in at least two senses.  First, I have to be
optimistic about the house’s value, and believe it is worth more than
the market price.  (If I were pessimistic about the home’s future value,
I would simply avoid buying it.)18  Second, I have to be optimistic
about my own valuation skills.  If I were pessimistic about my own fore-
casting ability, I would not trust my judgment more than the
market’s.19
Still, given sufficient optimism of both sorts, it is perfectly possi-
ble that some people might choose to speculate in the “spot” markets
for physical commodities like houses, wheat, or oil.  But as a general
rule, spot market speculation in physical commodities is an expensive
proposition.  If you buy wheat or oil with the hope that the price will
rise, you must find somewhere to store it and protect it from spoilage.
If you buy a house with the idea of reselling it, you must water the
flowers and cut the lawn in the interim, and when you do sell, you will
pay a hefty real estate agent commission.  There is no point buying a
house to resell for $25,000 more than you paid if you must pay a real
estate agent a commission of $30,000 to do so.  As a result, taking a
purely speculative position in the spot market for a physical commod-
ity like a house will only seem justified when the speculator anticipates
a relatively large price shift, in a relatively short time, with low transac-
tion costs.
Financial markets offer would-be speculators just such enticing
opportunities to try to profit from relatively large price shifts, in rela-
tively short periods of time, at relatively low cost.  (It is far easier and
cheaper to trade in mortgage-backed bonds or stocks in home-build-
ing companies than in actual houses.)  As a result, speculation is en-
demic in many financial markets.20  Consider the example of the stock
18 In spot markets, pessimists can only benefit from bearish forecasts if they happen
to own the commodity in question, in which case they can hope to avoid a loss by selling it.
Otherwise, to profit from a bearish forecast, a pessimist must either “short sell” (sell a
borrowed good that is subsequently repurchased at a lower price and returned to the
lender) or employ derivatives contracts, which are bets on the future. See infra note 29 and R
accompanying text.
19 Game theorists have argued that given certain conditions, it is irrational to trade in
the belief that one’s own opinion of value might be more accurate than another’s. See
Robert J. Aumann, Agreeing to Disagree, 4 ANNALS STAT. 1236, 1236 (1976) (discussing the
effects of common knowledge on trading decisions); Paul Milgrom & Nancy Stokey, Infor-
mation, Trade and Common Knowledge, 26 J. ECON. THEORY 17, 17 (1982) (discussing a “no-
trade” theorem).  However, the conditions on which this argument rests are highly unreal-
istic. See Lynn A. Stout, Irrational Expectations, 3 LEGAL THEORY 227, 240–43 (1997) [herein-
after Stout, Irrational Expectations] (critiquing “no-trade” theorems).
20 See Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and
Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 616 (1995) [hereinafter Stout, Costly Casinos]
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market.  Most corporate equities are held by individuals, either di-
rectly or indirectly through institutional intermediaries like pension
funds and mutual funds.21  These individuals typically are saving for
some long-term project—paying for retirement or a child’s college tu-
ition.  Given such a long investing time horizon, we might expect an-
nual turnover in the stock market to be modest, with perhaps ten or at
most twenty percent of outstanding shares bought and sold each year.
Instead, stocks are traded so frequently that the average annual turno-
ver in U.S. equities today is more than 300 percent.22  Why do inves-
tors buy and sell so frequently and frantically?  Because they hope to
“beat the market” and do better by trading than merely holding.  They
disagree with market prices, believing they can beat the market’s re-
turn by buying low and selling high.  Indeed, this is the basic business
model for the entire industry of actively managed mutual funds.23
Speculative trading can be even easier and cheaper in another
financial market: the market for the type of contracts commonly
called “derivatives.”  For most of U.S. history, speculative trading in
derivatives was confined to futures and options trading on organized
exchanges like the Chicago Board of Trade.24  However, as a result of
relatively recent regulatory changes,25 the last quarter of the twentieth
century saw the emergence of an off-exchange or “over-the-counter”
(OTC) market in derivatives that by 2011 had reached a notional
value of $708 trillion.26
Derivative contracts are often vaguely described as investments or
assets (sometimes, as toxic assets).  However, the true nature of deriva-
tives is best captured by the short, simple word “bets.”  This is not
metaphor or hyperbole.  Derivatives are literally bets—contractual
agreements between two parties that one will pay the other an amount
(“[I]nvestors’ asymmetrical expectations will inspire them to seek short-term profits by
speculating on stocks they perceive as mispriced.” (footnote omitted)).
21 See id. at 643.
22 Leo E. Strine, Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance Question We Face: Can Corpo-
rations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long
Term?, 66 BUS. LAW. 1, 11 (2010).
23 See, e.g., About NAAIM, NAT’L ASS’N OF ACTIVE INV. MANAGERS, http://www.
naaim.org/about.aspx (last visited Mar. 18, 2012).
24 See Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private Ordering in the
Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 713–23 (1999) [hereinafter Stout, Why the Law
Hates Speculators] (discussing the common-law rule against difference contracts).
25 See Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 1, 18–22 (2011) [hereinafter Stout, Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis] (describing
legal changes in the late 1990s that permitted off-exchange derivative speculation on inter-
est rates and other financial phenomena); infra notes 120–25 and accompanying text. R
26 BIS Quarterly Review: International Banking and Financial Market Developments, BANK
FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS statistical annex A131 tbl. 19 (Dec. 2011), http://www.bis.org/
publ/qtrpdf/r_qa1112.pdf [hereinafter Amounts Outstanding of OTC Derivatives].  To put
this figure in perspective, it averages out to about $100,000 in derivatives wagers for every
human alive on the planet.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\97-5\CRN505.txt unknown Seq: 9 27-JUN-12 14:37
2012] UNCERTAINTY, DANGEROUS OPTIMISM 1185
of money determined by whether or not some future event occurs.27
This is exactly why derivatives are called “derivatives.”  The value of a
derivative agreement is derived from the future behavior of some “un-
derlying” market phenomenon (market prices, interest rates, credit
ratings) just as the value of a bet on the Super Bowl is derived from
the performance of football teams in the game.  (One can imagine an
optimistic bettor might also view her “sure thing” Super Bowl wager as
an investment or asset.)
For at least two reasons, off-exchange derivatives markets are par-
ticularly attractive venues for disagreement-based speculation.  First,
trading stocks and bonds generally requires the speculator to put up
the money necessary to buy the stock or bond in question.28  Off-ex-
change derivatives wagering, in contrast, can cost nothing initially, just
as placing a bet on the outcome of the Super Bowl may cost a bettor
nothing until the game is over and the gamblers learn who won and
who lost and must pay up.  (The opportunity to use derivatives wagers
to take very large speculative positions on market phenomena with
very little up-front investment explains why another term often ap-
plied to derivatives is “leverage.”  It also explains why derivatives trad-
ing is especially popular with hedge funds, whose business model is to
reap speculative profits from buying low and selling high.)
The second reason why derivatives contracts appeal especially to
speculators is that, because derivatives are fundamentally wagers, they
offer a unique opportunity for pessimists to try to make profits betting
on falling prices.  While this is hard to do in spot markets, which ac-
cordingly only attract speculators who expect prices to rise, derivatives
markets can be used by speculators who expect prices to fall.29
To sum up, it is possible to speculate—that is, to try to profit from
trading on disagreement about the future—in a host of different mar-
kets.  However, as a practical matter we can expect speculative activity
to be more common in markets where the costs of trading are rela-
tively low compared to the perceived profits to be reaped from differ-
ing opinions of valuation.  Given their low transaction costs and high
volatility, logic tells us that financial markets—especially the market
27 See Roberta Romano, A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation,
55 MD. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996) (defining derivative securities as “financial instruments whose
value derives from some other, more fundamental, asset”); Stout, Origin of the 2008 Credit
Crisis, supra note 25, at 5–6 (describing how “[t]he value of a derivative agreement is ‘de- R
rived’ from the performance of the underlying financial phenomenon”).
28 See Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators, supra note 24, at 728.  Of course, if a specu- R
lator can find a lender willing to make a loan to fund a stock purchase, she may be able to
make a speculative purchase without putting up her own money.  However, provisions of
the Securities Exchange Act limit stock investors’ ability to purchase shares “on margin” in
this way.  The restriction on margin purchases is one of a number of securities laws de-
signed to curb speculation in stock markets. See id. at 729–31.
29 See id. at 732 n.130.
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for corporate stocks and bonds and for financial derivatives—should
be archetypal speculative markets.
C. Contemporary Economic Views of Speculation
As we saw earlier, in the first half of the twentieth century, noted
economists like Frank Knight and John Maynard Keynes were keenly
aware of the roles that uncertainty and disagreement played in fo-
menting speculative trading in corporate securities.30  Nor is there any
reason to believe disagreement-based speculation in financial markets
has become less common today.  To the contrary, the increase in stock
market turnover in recent decades, as well as the appearance of a
multi-hundred-trillion dollar OTC derivatives market, suggests that
speculation now plays an even more prominent role in our economy
than it did in Knight’s and Keynes’s day.
Nevertheless, modern economic and finance texts typically pay
little attention to the roles that uncertainty and disagreement play in
markets, or the policy implications of this phenomenon.  Many basic
finance and economics texts don’t discuss speculation as an economic
activity at all.31  Those that do discuss speculation usually discuss it
only briefly, and rely on one of two common—but, as we shall see
below, incomplete and arguably misleading—descriptions of specula-
tive trading that implicitly assume away the twin problems of uncer-
tainty and optimism.32  This Article refers to these two descriptions as
the “risk hedging” and the “information arbitrage” theories of specu-
lative trading.
1. Risk Hedging
According to the risk-hedging theory of speculation, speculators
profit from trading on favorable terms with other actors in the market
who are willing to deal with them on slightly disadvantageous terms in
order to offload risk (or, relatedly but somewhat differently, in order
to seek riskless liquidity).33  For example, a risk-averse farmer with a
field of wheat that is not quite ready to harvest might enter a forward
contract with a speculator to sell the wheat at a price slightly less than
today’s prevailing market price and deliver it next month.  This allows
the farmer to lock in the price and avoid the risk that wheat prices
30 See supra notes 5–6, 8–9 and accompanying text. R
31 See, e.g., BRIGHAM & HOUSTON, supra note 17, at I-6 (index does not contain entry R
for “speculation”).
32 See, e.g., RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, FINANCING AND RISK MANAGE-
MENT  323 (2003) (describing derivatives speculators as “prepared to take on risk”); PAUL
A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 422 (10th ed. 1976) (describing speculators as “‘arbitragers’
who keep their ear to the market”).
33 See Stout, Irrational Expectations, supra note 19, at 228–31 (discussing risk-hedging R
theory).
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might fall in the future.  He may even get immediate cash for his
wheat (liquidity).  For the farmer, this is much like getting twenty-four
cents now, rather than tossing a quarter and getting fifty cents later if
the quarter comes up heads, and nothing later if it comes up tails.
Risk-hedging and liquidity-seeking transactions do not require
uncertainty.  Even if both parties know and agree that the coin has a
fifty percent chance of coming up heads or tails, a risk-averse or li-
quidity-seeking actor might prefer a riskless twenty-four cents right
now over the coin toss later.  Similarly, even if the farmer and his
counterparty both agree on the probability that wheat prices will rise
or fall next month, the farmer might prefer to trade on slightly disad-
vantageous terms to lock in a price or to get cash today.  Thus risk-
hedging and liquidity-dealing trades are mutually beneficial.  They
benefit the hedger or liquidity seeker, who feels better off with less
risk or more liquidity.  They also benefit the “speculator,” who is ei-
ther an insurer paid to accept a risk she may be able to bear more
easily than the hedger (perhaps because she can pool it with other
risks to reduce overall risk through diversification),34  or a liquidity
dealer who is paid to bear the risk and expense of maintaining an
inventory of assets for buyers and sellers willing to accept a less advan-
tageous price in return for the convenience and safety of one-stop
shopping.35  But whether “speculators” are providing insurance or li-
quidity, the risk-hedging, liquidity-dealing theory fits the standard eco-
nomic model of mutually beneficial exchange that improves the
welfare of both trading parties.
2. Information Arbitrage
The information arbitrage model of speculation also suggests that
speculative trading can be socially beneficial, but through a quite dif-
ferent, and far less reliable, route.36  Information arbitrage theory
treats speculators as savvy researchers who invest in available but costly
information that allows them to make better probability estimates
34 Alternatively, the “speculator” may know of another risk-averse party—say a cereal
manufacturer that would like to buy the farmer’s forward contract to lock in a future sup-
ply of wheat at today’s price—and see an opportunity to profit by acting as the middleman.
Because the insurance industry is generally profitable, this suggests that insurance compa-
nies typically insure against only known and quantifiable risks, not against uncertainties.
35 Although I might be able to sell my used car at a higher price if I market it myself, I
am willing to accept the slightly lower price that a used car dealer would offer me in order
to enjoy the convenience of one-stop selling.  Similarly, a used car buyer might be willing
to pay the dealer a slightly higher price in order to avoid the expense and inconvenience
of launching his or her own search for a suitable automobile.
36 For perhaps the most famous exploration of the information arbitrage theory, see
MILTON FRIEDMAN, In Defense of Destabilizing Speculation, in THE OPTIMUM QUANTITY OF
MONEY AND OTHER ESSAYS 285, 285–91 (1969).
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than others can.37  Thus, a “speculator” who studies meteorological
patterns might conclude that a drought is likely and so buy forward
contracts for wheat in the expectation that wheat prices will rise by the
time of delivery.38
Like risk hedging or liquidity dealing, information-arbitrage trad-
ing does not require uncertainty.39  To the contrary, the information
arbitrage theory of speculation necessarily assumes that future
probabilities can be known with certainty by at least one party—the
arbitrageur willing to incur the cost of investing in information—who
therefore enjoys a certain advantage over her counterparty.  Mean-
while, an arbitrageur’s counterparties do not necessarily disagree with
the arbitrageur’s valuations.  Rather, they grudgingly accept that given
the relatively high cost of their acquiring more certain information
themselves, it is cheaper simply to accept the inevitability of trading at
a disadvantage relative to the information arbitrageur.
As this implies, “speculative” trading driven by information arbi-
trage differs from “speculative” trading driven by risk aversion or li-
quidity needs in that it cannot be presumed to benefit both parties.
Other actors in the market might well prefer to avoid dealing at a
disadvantage with better-informed arbitrageurs.  But information arbi-
trage still can provide a social benefit if arbitrageurs’ trades result in
more accurate market prices that help society efficiently allocate
scarce resources.  For example, the arbitrageur’s purchase of wheat
forward contracts might drive up prices and motivate farmers to plant
more wheat in a fashion that helps to offset the effects of the
drought.40
As noted economist Jack Hirshleifer has pointed out, it is easy to
overestimate the social value of the “price discovery” benefits of infor-
mation arbitrage, as often arbitrageurs may move information into
prices only slightly more quickly than it would arrive anyway.41  (It is
questionable whether the activities of “flash trading” hedge funds that
use computers to try to profit from trading milliseconds before others
do significantly improve the allocation of social resources.42)  Never-
37 See Stout, Irrational Expectations, supra note 19, at 229. R
38 See id. at 230.
39 Friedman concedes this point in his famous essay.  He calls uncertainty “avoidable
ignorance,” which he defines as an ex ante lack of knowledge about probabilities.  He then
makes clear that his essay intends to discuss only “speculation . . . without avoidable igno-
rance.” FRIEDMAN, supra note 36, at 287–88. R
40 See Stout, Irrational Expectations, supra note 19, at 230. R
41 Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to Inventive
Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561, 564 (1971).
42 See Jill Treanor, What Does High-Frequency Trading Do to the Markets?, GUARDIAN (Oct.
6, 2011, 6:19 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/oct/06/high-fre
quency-trading-flash-crash (noting that although “high-frequency trading could add liquid-
ity to markets and reduce the difference between the price at which customers want to buy
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theless, at least in theory, “speculation” that is really information arbi-
trage can contribute, at least on the margin, to social welfare.
Thus, when commentators emphasize either the risk-hedging and
liquidity-dealing or information-arbitrage theories of so-called specu-
lative trading, they are taking an approach that generally supports the
claim that speculation has at least the possibility of contributing to
social welfare.  But what happens when we leave a world where traders
face only risk, and enter the dark kingdom of uncertainty?  What are
the social welfare consequences of what this Article will call “true” or
“purely” speculative trading driven by subjective disagreement and rel-
ative optimism?
D. The Social Costs of Disagreement-Based Speculation
One of the most basic tenets taught to students in introductory
economics courses is that, absent fraud or duress, voluntary exchange
benefits both parties to the exchange.  This is, of course, the lesson of
Scottish economist Adam Smith’s famous metaphor of the market’s
“invisible hand.”  When the butcher gives a cut of meat to the baker in
return for a loaf of the baker’s bread, each party is better off (each
can now make a sandwich).  In making themselves feel better off, they
increase social welfare as well.43  As we have just seen, risk hedging
and liquidity trading conform to Smith’s basic model of mutually ben-
eficial exchange.  And while information arbitrageurs’ trades are not
mutually beneficial, they can provide at least an indirect social benefit
by moving certain but costly information into markets and producing
more accurate prices.
But trading driven by disagreement in the face of uncertainty
turns out to violate the basic free-market tenet that exchange im-
proves social welfare.  The reason is simple.  By definition, when two
people disagree in their forecasts of the future, we know ex ante that
only one (at most) can be correct.  When bullish Bob Buyer purchases
100 shares of Google from bearish Sue Seller because Buyer thinks
Google’s share price is going to rise while Seller believes Google is
about to decline, both initially expect to earn a profit (or in Seller’s
case, avoid a loss). But at least one of the two disagreeing traders must be
proven wrong.  Google’s stock price may rise or fall, but it cannot do
both simultaneously.  Disagreement-based trading is by its nature a
zero-sum game. Ex ante, Buyer and Seller both expect to benefit from
their trade. Ex post, at least one inevitably will be disappointed.
and sell,” this may accompany “increased volatility in markets . . . and perhaps . . . a correla-
tion between markets”).
43 See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NA-
TIONS, 273–75 (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House, Inc. 1937) (1776).
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This means that disagreement-based speculative trading involves
unilateral, and possibly bilateral, mistake on the part of the con-
tracting parties.  Like other contracts based on mistake, purely specu-
lative contracts cannot be presumed to improve social welfare by
leaving both parties better off ex post.44  Indeed, logic demonstrates
that speculation driven by disagreement and relative optimism in the
face of uncertainty reduces social welfare through at least three differ-
ent  mechanisms: reducing traders’ returns, increasing their risks, and
distorting perceptions of personal wealth in a fashion that contributes
to boom-and-bust economic cycles.
1. Reducing Wealth
First, when transaction costs are positive, trading on subjective
disagreement over the future reduces social welfare by reducing the
wealth of the trading parties.  To understand this point, suppose
Google stock is trading at $50 per share.  Suppose also that bullish
Buyer thinks Google stock is about to rise to $60, while bearish Seller,
who owns Google stock, thinks Google is about to fall to $40.  Assume
as well that in order to either buy or sell, both Buyer and Seller must
each pay transaction costs (e.g., brokerage commissions) of $1 per
share.
Thanks to uncertainty, Buyer sees an opportunity to earn a net
profit of $9 per share after trading costs from buying Google.  Seller,
in contrast, sees an opportunity to avoid a net loss of $9 per share
after trading costs by selling.  But whether Google rises or falls, one
party’s trading profit inevitably comes at the other party’s expense.
Meanwhile, each party has lost $1 per share—not to mention a por-
tion of his or her time and attention—to transaction costs.  These
transaction costs are a social waste, since the trade was a zero-sum
game that did not generate any net new wealth for the parties or for
society.
In contrast, the transaction costs associated with risk hedging and
liquidity dealing are well spent, because both parties view themselves
as better off after trading despite having incurred these costs.  As
Hirshleifer pointed out, the transaction costs lost to information arbi-
trage trading could be wasteful if they outweigh the social benefits the
arbitrageur produces in making prices more accurate.  But it is at least
possible that the price discovery that information arbitrage provides
might bring social benefits that more than offset the social losses from
the costs of trading.
44 See DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOM-
ICS 192–97 (1992).
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Not so with purely speculative, disagreement-based trading.
When speculators trade on disagreement, positive transaction costs in-
evitably ensure their net wealth will be eroded.45  Interestingly, this
possibility is well-recognized among experts who study stock markets.
As a number have pointed out, thanks to transaction costs, investors
who try to beat the market usually end up underperforming it.46
This observation also offers important empirical evidence into
the pervasiveness of disagreement-based speculation (as opposed to
risk hedging and liquidity dealing or information arbitrage trading)
in financial markets.  The risk-hedging and information-arbitrage the-
ories both predict that speculators as a class, over time, should make money.
Sadly for speculators, this prediction is rarely borne out in financial
markets.47  This is perhaps most obvious in the case of the stock mar-
ket, where it has been demonstrated time and again that, on average,
actively managed mutual funds that attempt to beat the market in fact
underperform it due to transaction costs.48  A similar pattern can be
seen in organized futures markets, where traders who self-identify as
profit-seeking speculators suffer losses on average.49
Of course, in modern markets, the transaction costs associated
with trading financial instruments like stocks, bonds, and derivatives,
although positive, are very low.50  Thus, it might be argued that if the
demand for disagreement-based trading is relatively inelastic, the so-
cial welfare losses from speculative trading in financial markets are
modest and can perhaps be ignored.51  This argument overlooks a sec-
ond, and perhaps even more serious kind of cost that speculative trad-
ing imposes on speculators and society: the cost of the increased risk
that can flow from disagreement-based speculation.
2. Increasing Risk
To see how speculative trading can increase risk, let us return to
the example of bullish Bob Buyer who expects Google’s price to rise,
and bearish Sue Seller who expects Google’s share price to fall.  But
45 See Lynn A. Stout, Technology, Transaction Costs, and Investor Welfare: Is a Motley Fool
Born Every Minute?, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 791, 797 (1997) [hereinafter Stout, Technology, Trans-
action Costs, and Investor Welfare].
46 See, e.g., JOHN C. BOGLE, COMMON SENSE ON MUTUAL FUNDS: NEW IMPERATIVES FOR
THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR 245–46 (1999); Stout, Costly Casinos, supra note 20, at 618, 635 R
n.65.
47 See Stout, Irrational Expectations, supra note 19, at 231–32. R
48 See Stout, Costly Casinos, supra note 20, at 623, 664. R
49 See Stout, Irrational Expectations, supra note 19, at 232 n.12. R
50 See Stout, Costly Casinos, supra note 20, at 633. R
51 See Stout, Technology, Transaction Costs, and Investor Welfare, supra note 45, at 808–10. R
If the demand for speculative trading is highly elastic, meaning a slight decrease in price
greatly increases demand, lowering transaction costs will actually increase social welfare
losses from trading. Id.
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now let us change our hypothetical a bit, and assume that prior to
trading, neither Buyer nor Seller had any economic stake in Google
shares.  Buyer can try to profit from his forecast of a Google price rise
by simply purchasing Google shares.  But how can bearish Seller profit
from her pessimistic forecast if she doesn’t have Google shares to sell?
The answer is simple: Seller can wager on a Google price decline
through derivatives contracts.
Seller might, for example, suggest a Google “swap” with Buyer in
which the parties agree that if Google’s share price rises, Seller will
pay Buyer the difference between today’s price for 100 Google shares
and tomorrow’s higher price, while if Google falls, Buyer will pay
Seller the difference between today’s price and tomorrow’s lower
price—but without any shares changing hands.  As we have already
seen, if Buyer and Seller have to pay transaction costs to arrange their
swap, their net wealth must be reduced accordingly.  But the swap has
done more than predictably reduce Buyer’s and Seller’s wealth; it has
also increased the amount of risk they are exposed to.  By entering the
Google swap, Buyer is now exposed to a source of risk that he was not
exposed to before.  He now has a risk that if Google’s price falls, he
will lose money.  Similarly, Seller is now exposed to a new risk of loss
should Google shares rise.
As this example illustrates, speculative trading in general—and
speculative trading in derivatives in particular—can create new risks
for traders exactly as gambling creates new risks for gamblers.  (You
may enter a casino with a riskless $100 bill, but once you start playing
roulette you are likely to leave with either more or less.)  This should
not come as a surprise.  As noted earlier, despite the plethora of vague
euphemisms the finance industry likes to apply to derivatives—“as-
sets,” “investments,” “leverage,” “contracts,” and so forth—derivatives
are nothing more or less than bets on financial phenomena.  Again,
this is not a figure of a speech.  The Google swap arranged between
Buyer and Seller neatly fits the definition of a bet as an agreement
between parties that one will pay the other an amount of money deter-
mined by whether or not some forecasted event occurs in the future.
It is important to note, however, that talking about derivatives in
a straightforward fashion as bets or wagers does not necessarily imply
that derivatives always add risk or that they might not be socially bene-
ficial.  As the insurance industry demonstrates, sometimes betting con-
tributes to social welfare by actually reducing risk.52  Similarly,
derivatives bets can be used to reduce risk.  For example, if bearish
Sue Seller works for Google and is concerned the firm might suffer a
52 Buying fire insurance on your house is really betting with your insurance company
that your house will burn down.  If the house burns, you win the bet, while losing the
house.
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reversal and that she might lose her job, she can offset the risk of lost
future income by selling Google futures or credit default swaps (CDS)
that increase in value as Google’s stock declines.
Thus, it is ultimately an empirical question whether any particu-
lar derivatives wager has the practical effect of creating new risks, or
hedging against and reducing old ones.  But it is also worth noting
that derivatives gambling on financial markets can not only create new
risks, it can create risks that are orders of magnitude larger than the
risks in the underlying financial market being bet on.  For example, a
derivatives trader might sell $1 million in credit default swaps (CDS)
on a $100,000 corporate bond, just as a racetrack gambler might place
a $100,000 bet on a horserace with a $10,000 purse.
3. Distorting Consumption Decisions
Finally, disagreement-based speculation in financial markets can
impose a third type of social cost by distorting individuals’ savings and
consumption decisions, leading to financial instability and boom-and-
bust cycles.  This is because speculation under conditions of uncer-
tainty increases perceptions of personal wealth in much the same way
that excessive lending under conditions of uncertainty increases per-
ceptions of personal wealth.  As in the case of credit bubbles, the re-
sult can be asset price increases and temporary overconsumption that
must eventually be paid for with reduced consumption, harming eco-
nomic growth.
It is a truism in finance that “an expansion of bank lending is
tantamount to an expansion in the money supply.”53  To understand
this point, assume a simple world with a car dealer who has a $20,000
car, a bank that has $20,000 in cash, and Bill Borrower, who has noth-
ing.  The monetary value of the wealth in this small, three-member
society is $40,000 (the cash and the car).  But if the bank lends Bor-
rower its $20,000 on the promise he will repay it in the future, and if
Borrower uses the $20,000 to buy the car, our small society now has
$60,000.  The bank has a $20,000 asset (Borrower’s debt), Borrower
has a $20,000 car, and the car dealer has the $20,000 in cash.
How did our small society’s wealth increase from $40,000 to
$60,000?  In effect, by accepting a loan, Borrower “monetized” his op-
timistic expectation that he would earn money in the future to pay off
the loan he received today.  In this sense, banks that make loans are
like a combination ATM and time machine, generating money from
people’s forecasts of their own future incomes.  If those forecasts
prove too optimistic—if both Borrower and the bank, faced with un-
53 JAMES GRANT, MONEY OF THE MIND: BORROWING AND LENDING IN AMERICA FROM THE
CIVIL WAR TO MICHAEL MILKEN 220 (1992).
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certainty, have overestimated Borrower’s future ability to repay the
loan—a credit bubble results, leading to rising asset prices (because
an expanding money supply chases a fixed pool of assets) and over-
consumption (because lending leads borrowers to feel richer than
they really are).54
Much the same result obtains when disagreement-based specula-
tion in financial markets leads speculators to believe that the stocks,
bonds, or financial derivatives they buy today are going to rise in value
in the future.55  Optimistic expectations for future speculative gains
lead speculators to believe subjectively that they are wealthier than
they really are, leading to rising asset prices and overconsumption.
Then this optimism becomes monetized, albeit in the form of an “ex-
pected money” bubble rather than an actual money bubble from ex-
panding credit.
As an example of this phenomenon, consider the story told by a
hedge fund manager who recounted how a junior derivatives trader
rushed into his office one day after negotiating a deal with an invest-
ment bank.  “This is a great transaction,” bubbled the junior trader.
“Both sides are making money!”56  Such mutual optimism explains
why so many in the finance world like to optimistically describe deriva-
tives as adding “leverage” rather than simply describing them as ad-
ding “risk.”
Thus, speculative bubbles, like credit bubbles, distort perceptions
of personal wealth in ways that distort consumption and savings deci-
sions.  It should be noted, however, that speculative bubbles are some-
what easier to detect than credit bubbles.57  Banks, hedge funds, and
mutual funds speculate in risky derivatives to make profits, just as
banks lend money to risky borrowers to profit.  In the case of bank
lending, however, the expected profits from lending may turn out to
be real: it is actually possible to make loans that are always, or almost
always, repaid.  In contrast, the zero-sum nature of speculation en-
sures that speculators’ perceived opportunities for gain must be, on
average, an illusion.  Nevertheless, until the uncertain future is re-
vealed, speculators enjoy a subjective perception of greater wealth that
54 Cf. GEORGE COOPER, THE ORIGIN OF FINANCIAL CRISES: CENTRAL BANKS, CREDIT BUB-
BLES AND THE EFFICIENT MARKET FALLACY (2008) (describing the nature and causes of credit
bubbles).
55 This phenomenon is related to the familiar “winner’s curse.” See RICHARD H. THA-
LER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 50–62 (1992).
56 The author is indebted to Nick Patterson, a former hedge fund research manager,
for this anecdote.  Its humor lies in the hard reality that, just as two people who make a bet
with each other cannot both profit from the bet, counterparties in a derivatives deal can-
not both make money from the deal.
57 See Harrison Hong & David Sraer, Quiet Bubbles 1 (Feb. 21, 2011) (working paper),
available at http://www.princeton.edu/bcf/newsevents/seminar/Harrison-quiet.pdf.
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eventually must disappear (unless, of course, the losing speculator re-
ceives a government bailout).
E. Summary: Disagreement-Based Trading as Market Failure
Every student who takes an introductory economics course learns
that markets sometimes fail to maximize social welfare.  Externalities,
principal–agent problems, anticompetitive tactics, informational
asymmetries, and public goods all present situations where govern-
ment intervention has the potential to allocate resources more effi-
ciently than letting the “free market” reign.58  To this list of
foreseeable market failures, this Article adds another: disagreement-
based speculative trading.
We have examined how disagreement-based trading in the face of
uncertainty predictably reduces traders’ returns, increases their risks,
and distorts perceptions of personal wealth in a fashion that contrib-
utes to boom-and-bust economic cycles.  Thus, highly speculative mar-
kets seem ideal arenas for government intervention.  This
intervention could take a wide variety of forms, including refusing to
enforce speculative transactions, making them more difficult, taxing
them, or simply prohibiting them.59  Each approach offers hope for
limiting the social losses that flow from disagreement-based trading.
Unfortunately, as we shall see in Part II of this Article, there is
reason to fear that disagreement-based trading is a form of market
failure that is likely to prove particularly difficult for democratic socie-
ties to address.  Populist governance institutions—democratically
elected legislatures in particular—are reasonably well suited for curb-
ing activities that impose observable external costs on others (theft,
fraud, polluting) and for providing needed public goods (police,
parks, military defense).  But they may be structurally unsuited to
curbing optimism-driven speculation in financial markets.
II
OPTIMISM AND DEMOCRATIC FAILURE IN THE REGULATION OF
OTC DERIVATIVES
A. Optimism and Regulatory Failure
When markets cause trouble, it is natural to think of government
intervention as a potential solution.  At the same time, experts who
study government and political science have long recognized that, just
58 See Richard O. Zerbe Jr. & Howard McCurdy, The End of Market Failure, REGULATION,
Summer 2000, at 10, 10–11, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv23n2/
zerbe.pdf (exploring the boundaries of market failure).
59 For a discussion of examples of a variety of different legal approaches to curbing
speculation, see Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators, supra note 24, at 722–33. R
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as markets sometimes fail to efficiently allocate resources, govern-
ments sometimes fail to efficiently regulate markets.  For example, an
extensive literature investigates how small, organized interest groups
(e.g., corn farmers) can push through self-interested policy agendas
(e.g., ethanol subsidies) that exploit a much larger but more disorga-
nized and inattentive general public.60
We can expect to confront these sorts of well-understood “public
choice” obstacles in attempting to efficiently regulate speculative trad-
ing in financial markets, just as we can expect to confront them in
other areas of public policy.  In particular, stock exchanges and bro-
ker-dealers who make a living from providing their services to specu-
lating investors would resist any attempt to limit speculative trading in
corporate stocks.  Similarly, attempts to rein in OTC derivatives trad-
ing have been vigorously—and to a considerable extent, success-
fully—fought off by Wall Street interests, especially investment banks
that run derivatives dealing desks.61  After all, such middlemen not
only expect to profit from derivatives trading, they are the only parties
that reliably do.
But in addition to such well-studied and well-understood sources
of regulatory failure, optimism in the face of uncertainty may throw
up another virtually insurmountable barrier to curbing disagreement-
based speculative trading in financial markets.  This is because opti-
mism and uncertainty not only drive speculation, they also undermine
our political capacity to rein in speculation through democratically
“accountable” institutions like elected legislatures or elected
executives.
In particular, optimism in the face of uncertainty raises a power-
ful, if hitherto unrecognized, public choice barrier to regulation be-
cause it results in adverse selection among those who might become
politically active in a fashion that systematically prevents the develop-
ment of any active constituency that would try to rein in speculative
trading.  To understand this adverse selection bias, it is useful to start
by thinking about the selection bias inherent in voluntary market ex-
change: people only enter trades when they think trading will make
them better off.  If they think a particular trade will leave them worse
off, they decline to trade.62
This process of self-selection in markets does not pose a problem
(is not “adverse”) when we are talking about trades of the Adam Smith
variety that actually promote the parties’ joint welfare.  But the selec-
60 See generally BARNES & STOUT, supra note 44, at 476–527 (discussing public choice R
literature and interest-group theory).
61 See Jeremy Grant, Wall St ‘Allergic’ to OTC Derivative Reform, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 11,
2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1771a5fc-2d3a-11df-9c5b-00144feabdc0.html.
62 See Stout, Costly Casinos, supra note 20, at 642 n.84. R
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tion bias intrinsic in voluntary market exchange poses special difficul-
ties when we are dealing with disagreement-based trading that the
parties think will make them better off ex ante, but which predictably
makes them worse off ex post.63  Consider again the example of bullish
Bob Buyer and bearish Sue Seller.  Before they begin trading Google
stock or Google equity swaps with each other, Buyer and Seller both
expect to reap profits from their deal.  Even though one is optimistic
about Google’s fate and the other pessimistic, both are self-selected
optimists when it comes to their belief in their personal abilities to
reap profits from trading on their forecasts for the future.64
This means that before trading, Buyer and Seller would each per-
ceive any rule making speculation more difficult—say, a transaction
tax—as working against their financial interests.  For this reason, we
cannot expect either Buyer or Seller to show any enthusiasm for regu-
lations that restrain their speculative trading ex ante.  To the contrary,
each would perceive any attempt at such regulation as reducing their
expected future wealth.
What about individuals who are more pessimistic about their fore-
casting ability?  Their remedy is simple: they decline to speculate at
all.  In effect, pessimists who doubt their own speculative talents sim-
ply opt out of speculative trading, protecting themselves from the pos-
sibility of future risk and losses by declining to trade in the first
place.65
The overall effect of selection bias in speculative trading is that,
ex ante, optimistic speculators don’t demand regulation because they
think it will harm their interests, while pessimistic nonspeculators sim-
ilarly don’t demand regulation because they think it unnecessary for
self-protection.  But what happens later, after the speculators have
found out through bitter experience that speculating has reduced
their returns, increased their risks, and distorted their perceptions of
their own wealth?  Might we see ex post democratic demand for reining
in speculative disagreement-based trading?
Unfortunately, we can imagine at least three reasons why specula-
tors might not push for government intervention even after suffering
substantial trading losses.  First, there is the embarrassing problem of
having to admit one was a “loser” in the trading game.  Second, some
traders who lose may nevertheless remain optimistic about their trad-
63 See id. at 614–17.
64 See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing how speculation requires opti- R
mism about one’s own ability to make forecasts).
65 One interesting study documents a real-life example of this selection bias: women
who own stock portfolios earn significantly higher average investment returns than men
do, for the simple reason that men trade more often and so incur higher transaction costs.
Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Boys Will Be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common
Stock Investment, 116 Q.J. ECON. 261, 278 (2001).
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ing abilities and dismiss their losses as the result of poor timing or
poor luck; these eternal hopefuls may still believe they can reap future
profits if they are allowed to speculate (although they might try their
hand at other markets, say for currency futures, or for gold).  Third
and perhaps greatest, chastened speculators who decide they can’t
profit from trading will rationally conclude they can adequately pro-
tect themselves from future losses simply by refraining from trading.
In other words, losing speculators won’t clamor for government inter-
vention because they can protect themselves simply by becoming ex-
speculators.66
The result is that, just as optimism in the face of uncertainty pro-
duces market failure in the form of disagreement-based trading, it
also produces political failure in democratic systems that emphasize
accountability to the public’s demands. Ex ante, people who think
they will lose money by speculating simply don’t speculate, while those
who think they will profit from speculating affirmatively object to reg-
ulations that make speculation more difficult. Ex post, even former
speculators who suffered losses still believe regulation is unnecessary
because now they can protect themselves from future losses by re-
fraining from further trading.
This analysis raises serious questions about the wisdom and effi-
cacy of democratic governance when it comes to addressing the eco-
nomic harms that flow from financial speculation.  Political
institutions that are subject to democratic pressures—especially
elected legislatures and elected executive officers—may be fundamen-
tally unsuited to addressing the negative economic effects of disagree-
ment-based trading in financial markets.  Legislatures and elected
executives may be relatively effective when it comes to addressing mar-
ket failures that the voting public can easily recognize and anticipate
(e.g., limiting the external costs that result from deliberate fraud and
manipulation in financial markets, or promoting the public benefit of
a uniform mandatory disclosure system that provides investors with
cheap and accessible information).  But when economic inefficiency
can be traced most directly to people’s own optimism about their abil-
ity to forecast in the face of uncertainty, the problems that result are
not likely to be recognized except, perhaps, in the wake of collective
disaster.  And even then, once the immediate crisis is past, the
problems are likely to be quickly forgotten.67
66 See generally Stout, Costly Casinos, supra note 20, at 695–97 (discussing the effects of R
failed speculation on the speculator’s subsequent activities).
67 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends
to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1020 (2012) (“A good
crisis should never go to waste. . .  [O]nly after a catastrophic market collapse, can legisla-
tors and regulators overcome the resistance of the financial community and adopt compre-
hensive ‘reform’ legislation.”).
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This suggests that, when it comes to regulating optimism-driven
speculation, we would do better to rely instead on relatively
nondemocratic governing institutions and authorities, such as an in-
dependent judiciary, independent agencies, and even private self-reg-
ulatory bodies.  There is an extensive literature on the roles and
dangers of such nondemocratic institutions, and a full survey of all
their benefits and costs lies well beyond the scope of this Article.68
Rather, this discussion seeks to contribute in a small way to our under-
standing of the possible benefits of nondemocratic political institu-
tions by examining how they may offer unique advantages in
addressing the particular (and somewhat peculiar) public choice
problem posed by optimism-fueled speculation in financial markets.
In illustration, the next section of this Article offers a case study
of the history of the regulation of speculative trading in off-exchange
derivatives.  As we shall see, in the U.S. alone, that regulatory history
dates back at least to the mid-nineteenth century.  Trading in deriva-
tives contracts has at different times and places been regulated by
common-law courts, state legislatures, an independent federal agency,
and the U.S. Congress.  By examining the relative success of these dif-
fering strategies, we can gain insight not only into the general ques-
tion of how to best regulate disagreement-based speculation in
financial markets but also into the challenges we still face in respond-
ing to the speculative excesses of the past decade and the 2008 credit
crisis.
B. A History of Speculative Derivatives Trading in America and
Attempts to Regulate It
1. Common-Law Regulation of Derivatives Speculation
Although derivatives defenders often describe derivatives as “in-
novations,” derivatives contracts have been used to wager on market
phenomena for millennia.69  An early American example was a type of
derivative known as a “difference contract.”  Difference contracts were
68 See generally Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency
Independence, 63 VAND. L. REV. 599 (2010) (discussing the costs and benefits of indepen-
dent agencies and their place in the constitutional structure); William M. Landes & Rich-
ard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875
(1975) (examining the role of an independent judiciary in facilitating beneficial economic
governance by balancing the political branches); Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Admin-
istrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985) (making a case for
broad delegations of power to agencies and administrators); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of
Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573
(1984) (querying the appropriate scope of administrative power in the constitutional
structure).
69 Aristotle recounts the story of philosopher Thales using derivatives contracts to
wager on his forecasts for the upcoming olive harvest. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 73–74 (Ben-
jamin Jowett trans., The Modern Library 1943) (c. 350 B.C.E.).
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agreements between two parties that one would make a payment of
money to the other determined by future changes in some market
phenomenon, usually the market price for an agricultural commodity
like wheat or corn.70  They were often formally structured like mod-
ern futures contracts, with one party promising to buy wheat at today’s
price and the other promising to purchase it, but with the contract to
be performed at some future time.  However, the parties further
agreed that the contract would not be performed by actually deliver-
ing the wheat.  Rather, the wheat “buyer” would pay the “seller” the
difference between the contract price and the market price of wheat
at the time of performance.
Not surprisingly, difference contract trading proved highly ap-
pealing to speculators.  The transaction costs involved in difference
contract trading were much lower than those associated with spot
market trading in physical commodities and may have compared fa-
vorably to trading in corporate securities.71  Moreover, because differ-
ence contracts were essentially wagers, they could be used to bet on
price declines and to take speculative positions virtually without cost—
at least, until the bet came due.
Part I examined how disagreement-based trading can be viewed
as a form of market failure.  This view is consistent with the suspicious
attitude common-law courts adopted toward difference contracts, as
reflected in an ancient and fundamental contract law doctrine that
has been nearly forgotten today: the “rule against difference
contracts.”72
As the rule was described in one 1884 case from the United States
Supreme Court,
The generally accepted doctrine in this country is . . . a contract is
only valid when the parties really intend and agree that the goods
are to be delivered by the seller and the price to be paid by the
buyer; and, if under guise of such a contract, the real intent be
70 See Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators, supra note 24, at 713–14. R
71 As recently as the 1960s, trading corporate equities required investors to pay sub-
stantial fixed brokerage commissions.  Annual turnover in corporate equities was accord-
ingly much lower, typically less than twenty percent. See Vaughn S. Armstrong & Norman
Gardner, The Effect of Financial Institution Objectives on Equity Turnover, 9 ACAD. ACCT. & FIN.
STUD. J. 13, 22 (2005) (reporting twenty percent turnover in the 1960s).  By 2010, with the
advent of deregulated brokerage commissions measured in pennies and near costless com-
puterized trading, average annual turnover in corporate equities was approximately 300
percent. See Strine, supra note 22, at 11. R
72 See Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators, supra note 24, at 713.  Although common- R
law hostility towards speculation is most apparent in the case of the rule against difference
contracts, it crops up in other areas of the common law as well, including the indemnity
and insurable interest requirements in insurance law, trust law’s “prudent person” rule,
and the champerty prohibition against buying and selling future interests in the outcomes
of legal disputes. See id. at 704 n.6 (referencing anti-speculation laws, including champerty
prohibition and sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
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merely to speculate in the rise or fall of prices, and the goods are
not to be delivered, but one party is to pay to the other the differ-
ence between the contract price and the market price of the goods
at the date fixed for executing the contract, then the whole transac-
tion constitutes nothing more than a wager, and is null and void.73
It should be noted that this rule was subject to an “indemnity” excep-
tion, under which courts would enforce contracts if one party could
show that he or she was in fact truly hedging and using the difference
contract to offset a preexisting economic interest that was at risk.74
Moreover, even when the hedging exception was not available, the
rule above did not treat pure speculative trading through difference
contracts as illegal or prohibited.  It merely precluded enforcement of
such contracts in public courts on grounds of public policy.
In describing this public policy, some cases employed moral rhet-
oric, describing difference contracts as “tainted and poisoned”75 or
“the source of great injury to morals.”76  But many others justified the
rule on economic grounds.  For example, courts often noted that dif-
ference contract speculation was at best a zero-sum activity.77  Al-
though they did not use economic terms like “opportunity cost,”
judges clearly understood that society lost when people devoted their
time and effort to the pursuit of personal profit through zero-sum
transactions.  Thus, one case condemned speculation in difference
contracts on the grounds that it “promotes no legitimate trade,”78
while another denounced speculation because it “discourage[s] the
disposition to engage in steady business or labor.”79
A second economic concern that courts associated with differ-
ence contracts seems even more relevant to our understanding of the
consequences of runaway speculation today.  This was the concern
that, by offering an easy way to bet on forecasts, difference contracts
tempted people to create and accept new risks.  Thus, difference con-
tracts trading was criticized for “encourag[ing] wild speculations”80
and “induc[ing] men to risk their money or property,”81 resulting in
“bankruptcies, defalcations of public officers, embezzlements, forger-
73 Irwin v. Williar, 110 U.S. 499, 508–09 (1884).
74 See Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators, supra note 24, at 718–19. R
75 Cunningham v. Nat’l Bank of Augusta, 71 Ga. 400, 403 (1883).
76 State v. Stripling, 21 So. 409, 410 (Ala. 1897).
77 See Brua’s Appeal, 55 Pa. 294, 299 (1867) (“[T]he losing party has received . . . for
the money parted with . . . nothing at all.  The lucky winner of course is the gainer, and he
will continue so until fickle fortune in due time makes him feel the woes he has inflicted
on others.”).
78 Melchert v. Am. Union Tel. Co., 11 F. 193, 195 (C.C.D. Iowa 1882).
79 Justh v. Holliday, 13 D.C. (2 Mackey) 346, 349 (1883).
80 Id. at 348–49.
81 Brua’s Appeal, 55 Pa. at 298–99.
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ies, larcenies, and death.”82  The result was to “fill the cities with the
bankrupt victims” brought down by their own speculative fever.83
Moreover, some cases acknowledged that risks created by speculating
traders might be borne not just by the traders themselves, but by the
broader community.  One 1872 Pennsylvania decision warned that a
crash in a speculative market would “carry[ ] down the bona fide
dealer in its collapse.”84  This fear echoes modern concerns about “sys-
temic risk”—the possibility that the risks created by rampant specula-
tion threaten the stability of interconnected markets.
Finally, nineteenth-century case law expressed judicial fears that
unrestrained speculation could lead to bubbles and price spikes, fears
that resonate with the idea that optimism-fueled speculative trading
can inflate perceptions of wealth and encourage excessive consump-
tion.  In 1882, for example, a federal district court judge in Iowa con-
demned difference contracts for “agitat[ing] the markets,” observing
that “sudden fluctuations in values are [the] illegitimate progeny” of
speculative trading.85  An 1883 case faulted difference contracts for
“derang[ing] prices to the detriment of the community.”86  The same
Pennsylvania judge who expressed concern for systemic risk also ob-
served that “ventures upon prices invite men of small means to enter
into transactions far beyond their capital, which they do not intend to
fulfil [sic], and thus the apparent business in the particular trade is
inflated and unreal, and like a bubble needs only to be pricked to
disappear.”87
In sum, a survey of nineteenth-century contract cases shows that
the judiciary seemed quite cognizant of the danger that speculation in
derivatives could waste valuable resources, increase risks, and distort
market prices.  What is more, common-law courts routinely employed
the rule against difference contracts to discourage such purely specu-
lative transactions.
2. Private Ordering and the Rise of Futures Exchanges
As noted above, despite courts’ concern about the negative eco-
nomic effects of derivatives speculation, the common law did not try
to stop those who wanted to use difference contracts to wager on the
markets from doing so.  It simply declined to subsidize speculators by
allowing them to employ public courts to enforce their bets.88  As a
result, would-be speculators had to worry that their counterparties
82 Cunningham v. Nat’l Bank of Augusta, 71 Ga. 400, 403 (1883).
83 Justh, 13 D.C. (2 Mackey) at 349.
84 Kirkpatrick v. Bonsall, 72 Pa. 155, 158 (1872).
85 Melchert v. Am. Union Tel. Co., 11 F. 193, 195 (C.C.D. Iowa 1882).
86 Justh, 13 D.C. (2 Mackey) at 349.
87 Kirkpatrick, 72 Pa. at 158.
88 See Irwin v. Williar, 110 U.S. 499, 508–09 (1884).
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might not perform.  A private solution to this enforcement problem
soon emerged: privately organized futures exchanges.
Buyers and sellers have met to exchange their wares for millen-
nia.  However, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century,89 U.S. agri-
cultural exchanges came to be dominated not by producers and
consumers dealing in physical corn or cotton, but by traders exchang-
ing “elevator receipts” representing a quantity of a commodity stored
elsewhere (e.g., in a grain elevator).90  Soon elevator receipts
morphed into “futures contracts” that called for delivery of the com-
modity in the future, at today’s market price.  However, most ex-
change-traded futures were not performed by actually delivering the
corn or cotton.  Rather, traders employed a “set off” process, purchas-
ing a second, offsetting futures contract for delivery of the same quan-
tity of the same goods on the same date.91  Futures contracts
performed by set-off were just difference contracts by another name.
Nevertheless, traders who wanted to use exchange-traded futures
for speculation rather than hedging generally did not worry their
counterparties might use the common-law rule against difference con-
tracts as an excuse not to perform.  This is not because public courts
enforced speculative futures contracts, but because anyone who
wanted to trade on a futures exchange had to use the brokerage ser-
vices of an exchange member who would guarantee the traders’ per-
formance.92  Members were closely monitored by the exchanges, and
were required to meet capital requirements, to post collateral, and to
use standardized contract terms to further the offset process.  Thus,
the commodity exchanges functioned like private gambling clubs
whose owners had the motive and the means to make sure that every-
one who gambled in the club would pay off their bets.93  Because ex-
change members collectively assumed the risk of nonperformance of
any futures contract traded on the exchange, they wanted to ensure
that both their trading clients, and their fellow members, could and
would perform.
89 The triggering event seems to have been the invention of the telegraph, which
allowed speculators in any major city to place bets on the prices of commodities they would
never see and could not even be sure existed. See generally Joel A. Tarr et al., The City and
the Telegraph: Urban Telecommunications in the Pre-Telephone Era, 14 J. URB. HIST. 38, 38–39
(1987), available at http://juh.sagepub.com/content/14/1/38.citation.
90 See Jonathan Ira Levy, Contemplating Delivery: Futures Trading and the Problem of Com-
modity Exchange in the United States, 1875–1905, 111 AM. HIST. REV. 307, 313 (2006).
91 See id. at 313–14.
92 See Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 245 (1905)
(“[T]he members make sales and purchases exclusively for future delivery, the members
dealing always as principals between themselves . . . .”).
93 See Lynn A. Stout, Regulate OTC Derivatives by Deregulating Them, REGULATION, Fall
2009, at 32, 33, available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv32n3/v32n3-1.pdf;
Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators, supra note 24, at 719. R
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The creation of the futures exchanges was accompanied by explo-
sive growth in speculative trading.  At the close of the nineteenth cen-
tury, more than twenty different futures trading markets had emerged
in the United States, dealing not only in futures on wheat and corn
but also contracts on mules, lard, beef, cheese, coffee, petroleum, and
a host of other products.94  The futures markets swiftly outgrew the
markets for the underlying commodities.  In 1888, an estimated 25
quadrillion bushels of wheat were traded through futures contracts,
even though farmers harvested only 415 million actual bushels of
wheat in the United States that year.95
Nevertheless, the private futures exchanges proved stable, long-
lived organizations that seemed reasonably adept at limiting the most
negative economic consequences of speculative trading.  Many futures
exchanges created in the nineteenth century—for example, the Chi-
cago Board of Trade and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange—still op-
erate today.  Moreover, while there were many financial crises during
the nineteenth and early twentieth century, none involved either dif-
ference contracts or futures trading on private exchanges.96  It ap-
pears that these early, nondemocratic approaches to regulating
speculation in difference contracts—the rule against difference con-
tracts employed by common-law courts, combined with the private
regulation of speculation on organized futures exchanges—worked in
tandem to limit economic disruptions and losses from disagreement-
based trading.97
3. The Trend Toward Codification and the Creation of the CFTC
If this nineteenth century structure served its purpose well, what
happened to it?  In brief, it fell prey to the same force that has con-
sumed much of the rest of judge-made common law in the twentieth
century—codification.
The process began at the state level in the late nineteenth cen-
tury with the passage of “anti-bucketshop” legislation that declared
94 See Levy, supra note 90, at 314. R
95 See id. at 313.
96 See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FI-
NAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 29 (2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT] (discussing banking
crises of nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
97 This relative success can be seen most readily when we compare nineteenth-century
regulation of derivatives trading with the nineteenth-century regulation of bank lending,
another area where relative optimism in the face of uncertainty can wreak havoc (e.g.,
when overoptimistic bankers and overconfident borrowers self-select and deal with each
other, speculative credit bubbles result).  Before the 1913 creation of the Federal Re-
serve—itself an independent and nondemocratic institution—speculative credit bubbles
and ensuing bank runs and panics were a routine part of American life. See id.  By compar-
ison, the derivatives markets were oases of tranquility.
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off-exchange speculative derivatives contracts to be not only unen-
forceable in the courts, but affirmatively illegal.98  Meanwhile, the or-
ganized futures exchanges also began to face criticism.  The problem
was not a failure to constrain speculation, but a less subtle issue: ex-
changes failed to police against fraudulent price manipulation
schemes.  Farmers and small business owners complained that traders
were using futures to “fix” market prices.99  As a result, Congress took
a first step toward regulating the futures exchanges by passing the
Grain Futures Act of 1922, reenacted in 1936 as the Commodity Ex-
change Act (CEA).100
Much of the CEA was devoted to ensuring that market manipula-
tion on future exchanges would be detected and prevented.101  But
the original CEA also codified and hardened the old common-law
rule against speculative difference contracts by banning trading in
off-exchange futures (derivatives).102  The result was a somewhat
heavyhanded federal approach to regulating futures exchanges that
nevertheless had one notable advantage: it continued to keep specula-
tive trading in commodity derivatives from causing problems for the
rest of the economy.  Apart from the occasional relatively minor ma-
nipulation scandals (onions in the 1950s, silver in the 1980s),103 fu-
tures exchanges functioned so smoothly after the CEA’s passage that
they received almost no public attention.104  This success may be due
in large part to the fact that the CEA was enforced not by an execu-
tive-branch agency subject to direct political pressures, but by an inde-
pendent agency, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC).105  Unlike executive-branch agencies, the CFTC and other
independent agencies typically are run by multimember commissions
98 See Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators, supra note 24, at 721. R
99 See Romano, supra note 27, at 24 n.57. R
100 See generally Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–25 (2006) (requiring traders
to operate on organized regulated exchanges).
101 See Romano, supra note 27, at 23 (discussing the CEA’s application to futures ex- R
changes for the prevention of price manipulation).
102 See id. at 26.  The original CEA regulated only futures trading in certain agricultural
commodities like cotton and grain.  In 1974, Congress expanded the CEA to apply to fu-
tures trading in “all other goods and articles” and created the five-member CFTC dedi-
cated to enforcing the statute. See Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators, supra note 24, at R
721–22.  As in the case of the common law, there was an exception for “forward” contracts
intended to be settled by actual delivery, which were presumed to serve a true hedging
purpose. See id. at 722.
103 See Kurt Eichenwald, 2 Hunts Fined and Banned from Trades, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21,
1989, at D1 (discussing how William and Nelson Hunt settled CFTC charges that they had
manipulated the silver market); Odorous Onions, TIME, July 2, 1956, at 66, 66–67 (describing
the onion scandal).
104 See Colleen M. Baker, Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-the-Counter Derivatives,
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1298 (2010) (noting that “exchange-traded derivatives are
relatively uncontroversial from a public policy perspective”).
105 See 7 U.S.C.  § 6b-1.
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comprised of individuals from both parties who, once appointed by
the President, serve a fixed term and cannot be removed except for
cause.106  This structure makes independent agencies relatively insen-
sitive to democratic pressures.
Still, even independent agencies are not entirely insulated.
Among other sources of democratic “accountability,” the CFTC’s com-
missioners are appointed by the President, and its budget is set by
Congress.  This may have left the CFTC open to political pressures
when in the 1980s and 1990s the agency found itself faced with a new
development: the appearance of a large and growing over-the-counter
(OTC) market for financial derivatives.107
4. Congress Unleashes Speculative Derivatives Trading
As we have seen, during most of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, derivatives wagering took place through difference con-
tracts or futures trading in agricultural and physical commodities like
wheat, gold, and oil.  In the final quarter of the twentieth century,
however, Wall Street came up with a new idea: wagering on other mar-
ket phenomena, in particular interest rates, through a new type of
instrument dubbed an “interest rate swap.”108
At first, OTC swaps traders may not have realized that interest
rate swaps might be deemed speculative “difference contracts” subject
to the common-law rule of unenforceability, or off-exchange futures
illegal under state anti-bucketshop laws and the CEA.109  By the early
1980s, however, would-be derivatives traders were painfully aware of
the problem.110  Financial firms mounted an orchestrated campaign
to give “legal certainty” to interest rate swaps.111
106 Bressman & Thompson, supra note 68, at 610–11. R
107 See Thomas A. Tormey, A Derivatives Dilemma: The Treasury Amendment Controversy
and the Regulatory Status of Foreign Currency Options, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313, 2331–33
(1997); Bank for Int’l Settlements, International Banking and Financial Market Developments,
BIS Q. REV., Dec. 2007, at 23–24, available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/
r_qt0712.pdf.
108 See Romano, supra note 27, at 27; Tormey, supra note 107, at 2323. R
109 See Jerry W. Markham, “Confederate Bonds,” “General Custer,” and the Regulation of De-
rivative Financial Instruments, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 18–19 (1994) (describing how the
CFTC initially paid little attention to the growth of derivative financial instruments); Stout,
Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, supra note 25, at 19 (“At first, financial firms accustomed to R
thinking of futures in terms of corn or wheat may not have realized that OTC swaps might
be ‘difference contracts’ void under the common law, or ‘off-exchange futures’ of the sort
banned by the CEA.”); Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators, supra note 24, at 766–67 (dis- R
cussing the CFTC’s initial reluctance to assert jurisdiction over difference contracts and
financial derivatives as off-exchange futures under the CEA).
110 See Tormey, supra note 107, at 2369–70. R
111 See Memorandum of Law of International Swaps & Derivatives Ass’n, Inc, Securities
Industry Ass’n & the Bond Market Ass’n, as Amicus Curiae, in Support of Plaintiffs’ Objec-
tions to Magistrate Judge Eaton’s Report & Recommendation to Judge Marrero at 5–6
(2002), Cary Oil Co. v. MG Refining & Mktg., Inc., 99 Civ. 1725 (VM)(DFE), (S.D.N.Y. Feb.
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The CFTC was headed at the time by Reagan appointee Wendy
Gramm, the wife of Texas Senator Phil Gramm and a conservative
economist who strongly favored deregulation.112  Accordingly, it was
an easy matter to persuade the supposedly independent CFTC in 1989
to issue a “safe harbor” policy statement announcing that it would not
attempt to apply the CEA’s ban on off-exchange futures to OTC trad-
ing in interest rate swaps.113  Another potential problem, however, was
the possible continued application of old state anti-bucketshop laws
and the nearly forgotten common-law rule against difference con-
tracts.  Would-be derivatives traders turned to Congress, and the
elected representatives quickly complied.  In 1992, Congress amended
the CEA to give the CFTC (still headed by Gramm) the legislative au-
thority to exempt whole classes of financial derivatives from the CEA,
and further declared that federal law now preempted the field.114
Both state anti-bucketshop laws and the common law were made le-
gally irrelevant.115
Just as nineteenth-century judges predicted, the almost immedi-
ate result was a series of swaps-fueled speculative disasters, including
the 1994 bankruptcy of Orange County’s pension fund.116  Still more
threatening was the near collapse in 1998 of the giant hedge fund
Long Term Capital Management (LTCM).  LTCM’s brush with failure
so terrified regulators that the Federal Reserve orchestrated a nearly
$4 billion bank bailout to rescue the fund.117
By this time, Wendy Gramm had left the CFTC to join Enron’s
board of directors.118  The agency was now headed by a Clinton ap-
pointee, Brooksley Born.  Interestingly, Born proved to be a truly in-
dependent CFTC Chair.  Concerned by the Orange County and
LTCM disasters, she tried to revisit the question of whether the CFTC
22. 2002) [hereinafter ISDA Memorandum] (describing industry effort to secure legal cer-
tainty for OTC swaps).
112 See Tyson Slocum, Blind Faith: How Deregulation and Enron’s Influence over Government
Looted Billions from Americans, PUB. CITIZEN 9 (Dec. 2001), http://www.citizen.org/docu-
ments/Blind_Faith.pdf.
113 See Stout, Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, supra note 25, at 19. R
114 See id.
115 See Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, § 502(a), 106 Stat.
3590 (amending 7 U.S.C. § 6); § 502(c) (amending 7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2)(A)).  The 1992
legislation thus put the final nail in the coffin of the nearly forgotten common-law rule
against difference contracts.
116 See FCIC REPORT, supra note 96, at 46–47 (describing post-1993 swaps scandals). R
117 FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINAN-
CIAL MARKETS 261 (2003); see also FCIC REPORT, supra note 96, at 57 (noting LTCM had R
entered derivatives contracts with more than $1 trillion in notional value).
118 See Slocum, supra note 112, at 3 (noting that Gramm joined the board of Enron, a R
major beneficiary of her deregulatory agenda, five weeks after her resignation from the
CFTC).
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ought to regulate OTC swaps.119  However, the derivatives industry
evaded her by appealing to Congress, which obligingly passed legisla-
tion that effectively blocked the CFTC from taking any regulatory ac-
tion until a “President’s Working Group” had investigated the
question.120  Born resigned from the CFTC; the Working Group rec-
ommended that “legal certainty” be given not just to interest-rate
swaps but to all other OTC derivatives; and Congress heeded specula-
tors’ calls by passing in 2000 a statute called the Commodities Futures
Modernization Act of 2000 (CFMA).121
Although the CFMA’s passage attracted little public attention, it
worked a radical change in the laws undergirding the U.S. financial
system.  For the first time in U.S. history, purely speculative, off-ex-
change derivatives contracts became legally enforceable,122 effectively
providing a government subsidy to derivatives traders.123
The rest of the story is reasonably well known, and I have told it
elsewhere in some detail.124  After the CFMA legalized purely specula-
tive trading in OTC derivatives, there was immediate and explosive
growth in the OTC market.125  Many of the best and brightest young
minds in math and science were called to Wall Street.  The financial
sector and the money supply boomed, but soon companies began to
fail due to speculative losses from derivatives trading.  First and fore-
119 See Over-the-Counter Derivatives, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,114, 26,115 (proposed May 12,
1998) (noting that OTC derivatives had caused a number of financial losses, and propos-
ing to reexamine the role of the CFTC in regulating OTC derivative exchanges).
120 See Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act,
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 760, 112 Stat. 2681; PRESIDENT’S WORKING GRP. ON FIN. MKTS.,
OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITIES EXCHANGE ACT 1 (1999)
[hereinafter WORKING GRP. REP.], available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
fin-mkts/documents/otcact.pdf.
121 See Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat.
2763 (2000); WORKING GRP. REP. supra note 120, at 9. R
122 See Commodities Futures Modernization Act of 2000 §§ 103, 120 (codified at 7
U.S.C. §§ 2(h) and 25(a)(4) (2001)).
123 Making speculative contracts legally enforceable is a kind of public subsidy because
it relieves speculators of much of the cost of enforcing their deals. See also Mark J. Roe, The
Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelerator, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 584
(2011) (describing how bankruptcy law also subsidizes speculative derivatives by giving de-
rivatives counterparties preference over other creditors).
124 See generally Stout, Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, supra note 25 (cataloguing the R
rapid growth of derivatives trading in the 2000s).
125 In 1992, shortly after the swaps exemption was adopted, the General Accounting
Office estimated the OTC market at only $12.1 trillion. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
GAO/GGD-94-133, FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO PROTECT THE FINANCIAL
SYSTEM 3 (1994).  After the swaps exemption was created but prior to the CFMA’s passage,
the notional value of OTC derivatives outstanding—mostly interest rate swaps and other
exempt derivatives—rose to  approximately $88 trillion. See Press Release, Bank for Int’l
Settlements, The Global OTC Derivatives Market Continues to Grow 3 tbl.1 (Nov. 13,
2000), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy0011.pdf.  By 2011, after passage of the
CFMA, the derivatives market had grown by an order of magnitude to more than $700
trillion. See Amounts Outstanding of OTC Derivatives, supra note 26. R
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most, ironically, was Wendy Gramm’s firm, Enron.126  Then 2008
brought the successive collapse or near collapse of several large finan-
cial companies due to losses from derivatives trading, including Leh-
man Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and insurance giant AIG.127  The
financial sector froze in panic, and the Federal Reserve was forced to
act as lender of last resort, committing nearly $8 trillion in credit to
prevent economic collapse.128  More than three years on, we are still
plagued by slow economic growth, high unemployment, and weak in-
vestment returns.
C. Summary: Democracy Is an Obstacle to (Re)Regulation of
Derivatives Speculation
A brush with death focuses one’s attention.  So does a serious fi-
nancial crisis.  Although the role that newly legalized OTC derivatives
speculation played in causing the 2008 credit crisis is still not fully
appreciated by many laypersons, in the wake of the crisis numerous
lawmakers and legal experts identified the CFMA as an important con-
tributing cause.129  Congressional politicians from the Democratic
side in particular embraced the goal of reining in speculative OTC
derivatives trading of the sort that nearly toppled AIG and its invest-
ment bank counterparties.130  Thus, derivatives regulation—or more
accurately, reregulation—became a central theme of the massive
piece of legislation that eventually became known as Dodd-Frank.
One key element of Dodd-Frank is Title VII, the “Wall Street
Transparency and Accountability Act,” which directly addresses the
126 Although Enron is often remembered for its accounting fraud, the motive behind
the fraud was the need to conceal massive losses the company had suffered trading energy
derivatives. See Jacqueline Lang Weaver, Can Energy Markets Be Trusted? The Effect of the Rise
and Fall of Enron on Energy Markets, 4 HOUS. BUS. & TAX. L.J. 1, 24–25 (2004) (noting that
when Enron’s accounting shams were exposed, counterparties in their derivatives trades
demanded that Enron provide more cash as collateral in light of Enron’s real debt
burden).
127 See David A. Skeel, Jr. et al., Inside-Out Corporate Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 147, 149,
185 (attributing the collapse of corporations like Bear Stearns, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and AIG to economic losses that were magnified by the
OTC derivative market).
128 See Bob Irvy, Bradley Keoun & Phil Kuntz, Secret Fed Loans Gave Banks $13 Billion
Undisclosed to Congress, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 27, 2011, 7:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2011-11-28/secret-fed-loans-undisclosed-to-congress-gave-banks-13-billion-in-
income.html.
129 See, e.g., FCIC REPORT, supra note 96, at 38–52; Michael Greenberger, Overwhelming R
a Financial Regulatory Black Hole with Legislative Sunlight: Dodd-Frank’s Attack on Systemic Eco-
nomic Destabilization Caused by an Unregulated Multi-Trillion Dollar Derivatives Market, 6 J. BUS.
& TECH. L. 127, 142–43 (2011); Seema G. Sharma, Over-the-Counter Derivatives: A New Era of
Financial Regulation, 17 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 279, 290 (2011); Stout, Origin of the 2008 Credit
Crisis, supra note 25, at 27–29. R
130 See Press Release, Comm. on Fin. Servs., Frank Circulates Discussion Draft of Legis-
lation to Regulate OTC Derivatives (Oct. 2, 2009), http://democrats.financialservices.
house.gov/press/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=539.
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problem of OTC derivatives speculation.131  The basic strategy Title
VII employs to reregulate the derivatives markets is, in effect, to re-
verse the CFMA’s 2000 grant of “legal certainty” to speculative OTC
trading.  Title VII does this by imposing a “clearing requirement” on
financial derivatives that is the functional equivalent of requiring
them to be traded only on exchanges whose members guarantee all
trades.132  Thus, like the original CEA and the common-law rule
against difference contracts before it, Title VII precludes public en-
forcement of speculative derivatives contracts that are not subject to
private ordering and enforcement.133
Perhaps Title VII will prevent speculative trading in derivatives
from imposing large macroeconomic costs of the sort we have recently
suffered, just as the common-law rule against difference contracts
largely succeeded, but there is reason to fear things may not work out
this way.  One serious source of concern is that, in the bruising legisla-
tive negotiations that led to Dodd-Frank’s passage, Wall Street lobby-
ists succeeded in weakening Title VII’s clearing requirement by
ensuring that Title VII gives the CFTC the discretion and authority to
exempt whole classes of admittedly speculative derivatives transactions
from the clearing requirement.134  Our brief examination of CFTC
history under Chairs Gramm and Born showed that while the CFTC is
an independent agency, it may not be independent enough to deal
reliably with the market failure that results from disagreement-based
trading.  An even greater source of concern lies in the fact that Dodd-
Frank did not reverse Congress’s 1992 legislation declaring that fed-
eral law preempts speculative derivatives trading from state-level regu-
lation.  In effect, Congress has retained for itself the implicit power to
change its mind.  Federal law, and only federal law, now regulates de-
rivatives wagering.  And although for the moment federal law seems
focused on restraining derivatives speculation, that could change as
soon as the public’s collective memory of the recent crisis fades, and
131 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L. No. 111-203,
§ 701, 124 Stat. 1376, 1641 (2010).
132 See id. § 723.  “Clearing organizations” must perform the same sorts of trade-guar-
antee and enforcement functions performed by private futures exchanges in the nine-
teenth century. See id. (explaining clearing requirements); § 725 (defining derivatives
clearing organizations).
133 Also like the old CEA and the common law, Title VII provides an exemption from
the clearing requirement if one of the two parties to an OTC derivative contract is, in fact,
using the contract not to speculate, but to hedge against a preexisting commercial risk. See
id. § 724(c)(4).
134 Section 723 provides that the CFTC may “determine that the clearing requirement
. . . shall not apply to [a particular] swap, or group, category, type, or class of swaps.” See id.
§ 723(a)(3).
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the forces of optimism and adverse selection re-emerge to renew pop-
ulist enthusiasm for unleashing our speculative “animal spirits.”135
Unfortunately, these animal spirits, fueled by optimism and our
collective blindness to uncertainty, could easily create populist pres-
sures to dismantle the parts of Dodd-Frank that are designed to curb
disagreement-based derivatives speculation.  This irrational optimism
comes not from Wall Street,136 but from self-selected average voters
who optimistically believe that they can exploit opportunities for spec-
ulative trading for their own benefit.  When it comes to avoiding the
negative economic effects of disagreement-based speculation in finan-
cial markets, democratic societies face a bigger obstacle than conven-
tional interest group politics.  That obstacle is democracy itself.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of the 2008 credit crisis, the American public looked
to Congress and the President to take the lead in protecting our finan-
cial markets and economy from future disasters.  Both responded, but
in a fashion that leaves each with substantial authority to determine
whether and how speculative derivatives trading will be reined in.
This Article suggests that this approach, which leaves the question of
derivatives regulation largely in the hands of political institutions vul-
nerable to democratic pressures, is not likely to succeed.  More
broadly, it also highlights how optimistic self-selection in the face of
uncertainty raises unique public choice obstacles in addressing certain
policy problems.137
Democratic institutions are fundamentally ill-suited for dealing
with certain kinds of market failures, including the market failure that
flows from disagreement-based speculative trading.  Just as Keynes’s
“dark forces of time and ignorance” tempt us into trying to profit
from the zero-sum game of speculation, they also hide from us our
own best interest in reining in such trading.  History shows that only
relatively nondemocratic and unaccountable institutions have had
much success at restraining speculation, and their ability to do so was
weakened when they became subject to populist pressures.  The com-
135 See William Spencer Topham, Re-Regulating “Financial Weapons of Mass Destruction,”
Observations on Repealing the Commodity Futures Modernization Act and Future Derivative Regula-
tion, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 133, 141–42 (2010) (noting that Democratic President Clinton
signed the CFMA into law, confirming the deregulatory changes endorsed by Robert
Rubin and Lawrence Summers, and quashing the attempts of Chairperson Born).
136 See Simon Johnson, The Quiet Coup, ATLANTIC, May 2009, at 46, 49–50.
137 Although this Article has focused on the economic problem of disagreement-based
speculation, there are other policy issues that may present similar public choice problems
arising from optimistic self-selection.  For example, in the area of consumer finance, opti-
mistic self-selection is likely to pose an obstacle to attempts to limit consumers’ ability to
take out usurious loans that they are unlikely to be able to repay.
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mon-law rule against difference contracts, which effectively limited
speculative trading in derivatives to the venue of the private commodi-
ties exchanges, was crafted by the judiciary—one of the least demo-
cratic of our governing institutions.  When the common-law rule was
eventually supplanted and then preempted by federal legislation, even
the creation of a new independent agency could only slow, and not
stop, its eventual erosion.
Today, in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 credit crisis and
the economic woes that have followed it, we have ample motive to stop
and recognize the hazards that can flow from optimistic, disagree-
ment-based speculation in financial markets.  We also have ample op-
portunity to take steps to protect ourselves from similar hazards in the
future.
But we may well squander this opportunity if we rely only on solu-
tions that require elected lawmakers—or agencies under the power of
elected lawmakers—to serve ongoing roles as watchdogs charged with
reining in excessive speculation.  That strategy might be reasonable if
we lived in a world with only risk, and not uncertainty.  But just as
uncertainty tempts people into trying their hand at disagreement-
based speculation, it also creates populist pressures for laws and regu-
lations that not only fail to discourage, but instead actually subsidize,
speculative trading.  To address the economic problem of excessive
speculation we need different—and perhaps fundamentally undemo-
cratic—solutions.
